Privacy from Government

Reasonable
Expectations
of Privacy
Meet
Technologies
of Surveillance



Fourth Amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.



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Olmstead v. United States (1928)

- 1928: Olmstead was convicted of bootlegging, based on evidence from wiretaps.
- "The amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure."

Katz v. United States (1967)

- 1967: Katz is convicted for illegal bookmaking, based on wiretap evidence
- Supreme Court?



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Katz v. United States (1967)

• [A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.

Katz v. United States, Harlan concurrence

 [T]here is a twofold requirement, gfirst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."


Smith v. Maryland (1979)

 "When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business."



Kyllo v. United States (2001)

 "We think that obtaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."



• Which of these is an email most like?







Which is an email most like?

- Unless encrypted, it travels through the 'Net like a postcard, visible to anyone stationed at any of the ISP "hops" along its route
- -If most people don't realize this, is their "expectation of privacy" reasonable?
- Should we give *more* protection than the Fourth Amendment requires?

Sources of protection against surveillance

- Law
 - Fourth Amendment
 - Statute
 - Federal
 - State
- Code
- Markets
- Norms

Statutory Protections, and their limits

- Wiretap Act (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968)
- Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986
 - Wiretap Act, updated
 - Stored Communications Privacy Act
 - Pen Register / Trap and Trace
- USA PATRIOT Act, 2001



claims:

- Privacy Protection Act
- Wiretap Act (ECPA Title I)
- Stored Communications Act (ECPA Title II)



- Stored Communications Act (ECPA Title II) On appeal:
- Wiretap Act (ECPA Title I)
 - Interception?

requests	Real-time acquisition	Historical information
Contents of communications	Wiretap Act (super-	Unopened: Warrant
	warrant) or consent	Opened: Subpoena with notice (poss. delayed)
Non-content- transactional or subscriber information	Pen register / trap-and-trace	Subscriber info: subpoena
	order (warrant- minus)	Transactional: 2703(d) "specific and articulable
	or consent	facts" order

Adapted from Mark Eckenwile

USA PATRIOT Act

- PATRIOT changed standard for obtaining administrative subpoena
 - from "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person ...[was] a foreign power or agent of a foreign power"
 - to "certification ... that information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities"

You're the Fed

- As a government lawyer, you're involved in a criminal investigation. Can you get the information? With what tool? What showing do you need?
 - The email addresses of a suspect's correspondents
 - The contents of a suspect's past emails to BigRed, a suspected co-conspirator
 - The time and date of the suspect's last ten Internet connections through ISP
 - The name of the Internet user BigRed@hotmail.com
 - Future emails the suspect might send to BigRed
 - Immediate alerts when the suspect logs on to ISP in the future